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Temporal and spatial variability in constituency campaign spending effects 
in Great Britain, 1997 – 2015 
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Abstract: Existing research on constituency campaigning focuses heavily on studies of single 
national elections, and cross-temporal variability in campaign effects is rarely addressed. 
Similarly, campaign effects for a party at a given election are assumed to be uniform across the 
territory of the relevant polity. But both assumptions are questionable. In this paper, we analyse 
constituency campaign spending effects at British General Elections from 1997 to 2015 to 
explore their stability across time and space. In doing so, we also evaluate the empirical utility 
of some of the arguments theorised by Fisher et al. (2011) to explain campaign variability. Our 









Not all campaigns are created equal: 
Temporal and spatial variability in constituency campaign spending effects 
in Great Britain, 1997 – 2015 
 
 
Research on constituency campaign effects at British general elections consistently shows 
they yield electoral dividends and are increasingly integrated into parties’ national strategies 
(Denver and Hands 1997; Norris, 2000; Fisher and Denver, 2008). However, constituency 
campaigns are not equally effective for all parties, candidates, or elections. Labour and 
(especially) the Liberal Democrats have enjoyed relatively large campaign effects in their 
favour in past elections, while the Conservatives have often received little or no benefit 
(Pattie et al., 1995; Denver and Hands, 1997; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2009).  Furthermore, 
incumbent candidates generally receive a smaller boost from their campaigns than do 
challengers (Jacobson, 1978, 1990; Pattie et al. 2017). Variability of outcome is, therefore, a 
known risk of constituency campaigns. Nor is this surprising, as parties and candidates vary 
in terms of the strategic situations they face and the resources, skills and capacities of their 
local campaign teams (and of the campaign teams working for their rivals).  
 
Less attention has been paid, however, to other potential dimensions of variability in 
constituency campaign effectiveness. For instance, most studies look at constituency 
campaigning at single national elections; cross-temporal variability in campaign effects is 
rarely addressed. Similarly, local campaign effects for a party at a given election are assumed 
to be uniform across the territory of the relevant polity. However, both of these assumptions 
are questionable. In this paper, we analyse constituency campaign effects at British General 
Elections from 1997 to 2015 to explore their variability across time and space.1 In doing so, 
we evaluate the empirical utility of some of Fisher et al.’s (2011) attempts to explain 
variations in campaign effectiveness. Our results suggest that some of their explanations do 
not adequately account for the observed differences; the search for answers continues. 
 
Theorising variable constituency campaign effectiveness 
 
Temporal variations in constituency campaign effects might arise for a number of reasons. 
Most obviously, political parties do not campaign in a vacuum. They evaluate their own 
efforts and monitor rivals’ tactics and methods, both to spot and respond to developing 
threats and to identify ‘good practice’ which they might apply themselves. Although the 
process is unlikely to be smooth or precise, the effectiveness of a party’s local campaign 
efforts might oscillate over time, increasing as the party catches up with and surpasses the 
campaign tactics employed by rivals, decreasing as those rivals catch up in their turn.  
 
The effectiveness of a party’s constituency campaigns also rests on the activities undertaken 
within each constituency. Each local party faces distinct challenges with varying degrees of 
resourcing, resourcefulness and campaigning nous. Candidates’ local campaign efforts can 
also affect their individual electoral fates, irrespective of how the national campaign fares 
(e.g. Johnston, 1987; Denver and Hands 1997; Pattie et al., 1995; Benoit and Marsh, 2003; 
Whiteley and Seyd, 2003). 
 
                                                 
1 The following analyses focus on Great Britain (Scotland, Wales and England). Northern Ireland is excluded, as 
the party system there is very different from that in the rest of the UK.  
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Campaign contacts with voters can have a variety of effects. In some cases, a party’s 
campaign activity might persuade floating voters to vote for it. But most campaign contacts at 
the level of the parliamentary constituency (our focus here) are relatively fleeting and 
uninformative (delivering a short leaflet, for instance, or asking whether a voter is thinking of 
supporting one’s party: Denver and Hands, 1997, chapter 4; Johnston et al., 2012, 318; for a 
candidate’s-eye view, see Barwell, 2016, chapter 6). Active attempts at persuasion and 
argument on the doorstep are rare, and may be discouraged, for fear they alienate voters. 
Most such campaign contact, therefore, aims to mobilise existing supporters and those voters 
already leaning towards a party (ensuring as high a turnout of one’s own supporters as 
possible), rather than at winning over new converts.  In both cases, however, the net outcome 
is the same: effective and active campaigns should boost a party’s vote share relative to its 
rivals. In line with the existing literature on constituency campaign effects, therefore, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
H1: Constituency campaign boosts: All else being equal, the harder a 
party campaigns in a constituency the larger its vote share there will 
be. 
 
That said, local campaign spending is not equally efficacious for all candidates. Spending by 
challengers is generally more effective than spending by incumbents (Jacobson, 1978, 1990; 
Pattie et al., 2017).  By mounting active constituency campaigns, challenger parties and 
candidates raise their local profiles and boost their vote, potentially by enough to unseat the 
incumbent. But the situation is not the same for incumbent parties and candidates fighting in 
seats they already hold. They have undoubted advantages over their opponents, not least 
through already-established reputations for constituency service (Wood and Norton, 1992; 
Fowler, 2018). But they may have little to gain from further local campaigning: indeed, extra 
campaign effort from an incumbent might actually be a response to greater electoral pressure 
from increasingly viable challengers – a sign of electoral weakness, not of strength 
(Jacobson, 1978). In light of this, and again in line with the existing literature, we also 
hypothesise that:  
 
H2: Challenger vs. incumbent effects: All else being equal, parties 
defending seats will receive a smaller boost from their campaign 
efforts than will parties challenging in seats. 
 
But the effectiveness of each constituency campaign is unlikely to be divorced from the wider 
national context facing each party in any given election. When the national electoral tide is 
running against a party, for instance, it is likely that even the most well-run local campaign 
will find it hard to make much headway. And when a party’s national fortunes are in the 
ascendant, even its most inept local campaigners may enjoy better than expected fortunes. 
 
Fisher et al. (2011) discuss how the national electoral context might generate variations in the 
effectiveness of constituency campaigning. One such factor, they argue, is the overall 
competitiveness of a general election: the closer the national contest, the more important 
campaigns in individual seats (especially, as we point out below, those in the most marginal 
constituencies) become, and hence the larger the impact constituency campaigns are liable to 
have. They also reason that elections, such as the 1997 UK General Election, that are widely 
expected in advance to produce dramatic turn-rounds in the overall outcome should see more 
effective campaigns, especially for the main party of opposition going into the contest. They 
point to the importance of an effective centrally co-ordinated campaign strategy, which links 
4 
 
to inter-party variations in campaign effectiveness (as noted above). Applying Fisher et al.’s 
arguments to recent British General Elections, we thus generate two more hypotheses:  
 
H3: Overall competitiveness. The marginal returns to extra 
constituency campaign effort (at least for Labour and the 
Conservatives, as the main competitors for government) should be 
largest in highly competitive elections and smallest in uncompetitive 
ones. 
 
H4: Dramatic turnarounds. The marginal returns to opposition party 
constituency campaign efforts should be larger in elections where 
dramatic turn-rounds are anticipated than in elections where no 
major change is expected. 
 
Fisher et al. focus on the competitiveness of the overall national contest and how that might 
affect the efficacy of constituency campaigns. But how competitive constituency contests are 
also varies substantially locally. In some constituencies, one party is so far ahead of its 
nearest rivals that election results there are hardly in question. In other places, the gap 
between the incumbent party and the second-placed challenger is much closer and a relatively 
few extra votes either way could alter the election outcome. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we leverage this variation in constituency marginality to 
provide further insight into Fisher et al.’s hypothesis regarding the impact of competitiveness 
on campaign effects. Previous work has shown (unsurprisingly) that, partly as a function of 
central party coordination of local campaign effort (but also because most local campaign 
resources are local-sourced, and parties tend to have few resources in seats where they do 
badly), parties expend more campaign effort and resource in marginal seats (where it might 
help swing the result) than in safe ones (where it is unlikely to do so: see e.g. Denver and 
Hands, 1997; Pattie et al., 1995; Johnston and Pattie, 2014; Pattie and Johnston, 2016).  
 
To the extent that campaign spending is associated with improved vote shares, this implies 
that parties should see the greatest improvements in their vote in the most marginal seats, as 
these are where the parties will concentrate their resources. This could be the result of a 
simple linear effect. Crudely, if each extra pound spent on a local campaign wins a party x 
more additional votes, then we would expect to see more extra votes won where more 
resources are expended. But Fisher et al.’s hypothesis suggests something more: that the 
efficiency of the campaign increases as the contest becomes more competitive. In other 
words, the ‘bang from its buck’ a party obtains from each extra pound spent on its local 
campaign should be higher in more than in less marginal seats (see Johnston et al., 2018). 
This implies an interaction between seat marginality and the effectiveness of campaigning: 
 
H5: Campaign and marginality interactions: The more competitive a constituency 
is for a party, the greater the boost it should receive from each extra marginal 
increase in its campaign effort. 
 
In line with H2 above, we expect this to be particularly clear in seats where a party is the local 






Though plausible, these arguments have not been rigorously tested. Fisher et al.’s empirical 
analysis of the 2010 General Election, while sophisticated, cannot fully evaluate portions of 
their theory discussed above, since it provides only one case of a ‘national election context’. 
Furthermore, even those aspects which can be tested within the context of a single election 
(for instance, that campaigns might be more effective in more marginal seats) would benefit 
from being tested across a range of different competitions, in order to check the robustness 
and generalizability of any such effect. In this paper, therefore, we follow Pattie and 
Johnston’s (2009) lead and examine constituency campaigning over a range of elections – 
adding the 2010 and 2015 contests to the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections studied previously. 
In addition, we also leverage constituency variations in electoral context (and in particular, 
variations in incumbency and constituency marginality) at particular general elections to 
further increase the number of different electoral contexts examined. 
 
Measuring the campaign effect 
 
To conduct our analyses, we examine constituency election results at each UK General 
Election from 1997 to 2015, using a pooled data set (in which each case is a constituency in a 
particular election year). Thus, for each constituency, we have repeated measures of each 
party’s vote share on the election year, and on the party’s constituency campaign activity in 
that election, and we also have data on each party’s performance in the constituency at the 
previous election. The dependent variables in our regression models are the constituency vote 
shares achieved by the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats at each of the five 
General Elections. In line with the expectation that parties will experience different returns to 
their campaigns depending on whether they are local incumbents, we carry out separate 
analyses for seats defended by each party and for seats where the party was a local 
challenger. 
 
Reflecting relatively long-standing social and economic geographies of party support, most 
parties tend to do well where they have previously done well and badly where they have 
previously struggled. We therefore control for each party’s constituency vote share at the 
preceding General Election to take into account that underlying stability in the geography of 
party support.2 To allow us to investigate the effects of constituency marginality on campaign 
effectiveness (in line with H5), we operationalise past strength as party constituency 
marginality. Where a party is defending a seat, marginality is the difference in vote shares at 
the previous election between the second-placed party then and the incumbent. Where a party 
is the local challenger, marginality is the difference between its vote share at the previous 
election and that of the local winner. In both cases, the marginality variable runs from a 
hypothetical minimum value of -100 (the least marginal result possible) to a maximum of 0 
(the most marginal contest possible). This, combined with splitting the analyses between 
incumbent and challenger seats, both provides a proxy for party strength (in seats where a 
party is the challenger, the closer to zero the measure gets, the better the party did at the 
previous election; where a party is defending a seat, the more negative the marginality score – 
i.e. the further the seat is from being marginal for the party – the better it did at the previous 
                                                 
2 This is slightly complicated by periodic reviews of the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies, which 
mean the constituency map changes at various points in our analysis. In elections where a new set of 
constituencies is in use for the first time (as in the UK in 1997, in Scotland at the 2005 election, and in England 
and Wales in 2010) we therefore use estimates, prepared for the UK Press Association, of how the preceding 
election results would have looked had that contest also been fought in the new seats: these estimates are 
authoritative and widely used in analyses of UK General Elections (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997, 2007). 
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contest) and allows us to look at the effect of constituency marginality on campaign 
effectiveness, using interaction terms described below.  
 
Our key independent variable measures the intensity of each party’s constituency campaign at 
the election under investigation. Candidate campaign expenditure data for the (roughly) four-
week ‘short campaign’ period between the date on which parliament is prorogued and the 
election date provides a standardised measure that is comparable across parties and time.3 
Candidate expenditure is subject to a legally enforced limit, which is a function of whether 
the constituency is a borough or a county seat (i.e. whether it is mainly urban or contains 
some rural areas) and of the size of its registered electorate: we express candidate spending in 
each seat as a percentage of that legal maximum. Though not a perfect indicator of campaign 
effort (Gordon and Whiteley, 1980; Fisher et al., 2014), comparisons with other, independent 
measures of campaign intensity show that it is a good surrogate (Pattie et al., 1994; Johnston 
and Pattie, 2006, 202; Denver and Hands, 1997, 242). 4 
 
Unlike other possible campaign intensity measures, candidate spending data are available for 
all candidates at almost every election we examine here. The partial exception is 2015, when 
local government electoral returning officers (to whom candidates must return their expenses) 
in some local authorities did not forward the data to the Electoral Commission.5 Where the 
Commission did not have a return for a candidate in 2015, it entered £0 as the recorded 
expenditure. While in some cases a recorded campaign spend of £0 is real (e.g. where a party 
fields a candidate purely to get its name on the local ballot paper but has no expectation of 
either winning or even campaigning), most of the instances in the 2015 data are almost 
certainly missing values (in many cases clustered in the same local authorities; all candidates 
standing in particular seats are returned as having spent nothing even in seats where other 
information indicates that there were intense local campaigns – an inherently implausible 
situation). As we cannot differentiate between cases where the candidate really spent nothing, 
and cases where this is a missing value, we err on the side of caution and treat all cases where 
reported spending is £0 as missing (we do the same for a very small number of cases – 3 
Labour and 2 Liberal Democrat – where candidate spending in 2015 was reported as being 
over the legal limit). In 2015, 6% of Conservative candidates had a reported short campaign 
expenditure of £0, as did 6% of Labour candidates and 17% of Liberal Democrats. We have 
compared constituencies where candidates ‘short campaign’ spending in 2015 is missing (or 
is reported as above 100%) with seats where non-zero candidate expenditure is reported: 
there are no systematic differences between them in terms of who won the seat at the 2010 
election, or in terms of how marginal the seat was after that contest. While the specific 
problem described above affects only the 2015 constituency candidate spending data, we 
apply the same protocol regarding reported spending of £0 or over 100% of the limit to 
                                                 
3 Every candidate standing for election to the UK parliament is legally obliged to make a public declaration of 
how much he or she has spent on her campaign. 
44 It is possible that, as campaign spending increases, diminishing returns set in (the closer a party is to 
mobilising all its potential supporters locally, the greater the marginal effort likely to be required to add a few 
more to its vote). We have explored this possibility by adding a quadratic party spending term to our models. 
While the squared term is usually significant, the substantive effect is small: fit statistics such as R2 increase by 
only small amounts, and modelling the curve suggests that the deviation from a basically linear trend are 
generally very small. We have therefore omitted these experiments from our reported analyses and have 
reported only the linear effects of campaign spending. 
5 Since 2001, the Commission has compiled the candidate campaign data for the UK. However, this is not a 
statutory duty and returning officers are not legally obliged to forward the returns to the Commission: many 
more failed to do so in 2015 than at previous contests. 
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candidate spending in every election studied here to ensure as far as we can consistency and 
comparability across time in our analyses.  
 
How we handle (and what we count as) missing cases has consequences for a key analytical 
decision: whether to include spending by all major parties in each equation, or whether to 
focus just on spending by the party whose vote is being modelled. Past research (e.g. Pattie et 
al., 1995) shows that parties’ campaign efforts, as well as boosting their own prospects, can 
also reduce the vote shares won by their rivals: including all major parties’ campaign 
spending in each model would capture this. However, we opt to include only the campaign 
spending for the party whose vote is being modelled, and do so for two reasons. First, the 
problem of missing campaign spending data in 2015, described above, means we risk losing a 
relatively large number of cases by including all parties’ campaign spending, with most of the 
lost cases concentrated in one election year. Including just the modelled party’s spending in 
each equation maximises our sample size Second, as our analyses hinge on interaction 
effects, we are reluctant to include all parties’ spending in each model, as this would 
proliferate the number of interactions being modelled in each model, stretching our data too 
thinly. We are confident, however, that the paper’s major findings are unaffected by this 
decision.6 
 
To test our key hypotheses, we include not only the main effects for party campaign 
spending, previous party strength/marginality and for election year (with 1997 as the 
comparison), but also the interactions between party spending and past marginality (to test 
H5), party spending and election year (to test H3 and H4) and the three-way interaction 
between campaign spending, election year and past marginality (allowing an assessment of 
whether the effect of campaign spending on vote share is moderated not only by the 
marginality of the constituency race but also by the election year). 
 
 
Changing election contexts and the constituency campaign effect 
 
In this section, we analyse the impact of constituency campaigning on party vote share. As 
discussed above, we are particularly interested in temporal and spatial variations in the 
campaign effect, in line with Fisher et al.’s (2011) expectations, and we complement their 
focus on the varying context of the national campaign from election to election (and in 
particular on how close the national race was) with a further focus on the impact (if any) of 
constituency marginality on the effectiveness and efficiency of the constituency campaign.  
 
We turn first to an assessment of H1 (constituency campaign boosts) and H2 (challenger vs. 
incumbency effects). To analyse them, we use the pooled data set (with each case a 
constituency-election year) and model each party’s constituency vote share as a simple 
function of its constituency campaign expenditure (as a percentage of the legal maximum in 
the seat) and of how marginal the seat was for the party after the previous election (using the 
‘folded’ version of marginality described above). In line with H2, we run separate analyses 
for seats where each party was the challenger (Table 1a) and where it was the incumbent 
(Table 1b).  
                                                 
6 We have re-run the key models including terms for campaign spending by the main opposition parties. While 
the results largely confirm the findings of previous research (by and large, the harder a party’s opponents 
campaign in a seat, the less well the party does there), including opposition spending in the models makes little 
substantive difference to the core findings reported here. In the interests of parsimony and clarity, therefore, we 




The results support H1 and H2, and confirm the conventional wisdom on the effects of 
constituency campaigning. Not surprisingly, past marginality is consistently and significantly 
related to a party’s current vote share in unsurprising ways. The direct effect is significant 
and positive for Labour and the Conservatives in seats where they were the challengers (see 
Table 1a) and significant and negative for all three parties in their ‘incumbent seat’ models 
(Table 1b). Remember that this variable is coded so that the highest score (0) goes to the most 
marginal seats, and the lowest (negative) scores go to seats where the party was either a long 
way behind the local winner (in the challenger seats) or a long way ahead of the second 
placed party (in its ‘incumbent’ seats). In other words, the higher the marginality score in a 
‘challenger’ seat, the better the party did at the previous election. But in incumbent seats, 
higher marginality scores indicate contests in which the party did worse at the preceding 
election. So these results tell us pretty much what we would expect: parties tend to do better 
where they have done best in the past. 
 
But our main interest here is with the various campaign effects. In line with past research, the 
direct effects for the campaign spending variables substantially confirm H1 (constituency 
campaign boosts) and H2 (challenger/incumbent effects). Other things being equal, the more a 
party spent on its constituency campaign in seats where it was a challenger, the more votes it 
received (with the largest marginal effects being enjoyed by Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats). But, in line with H2, this was not true in seats defended by a party. There, the 
main effect for Conservative incumbents aside, the party’s campaign spending generally had 
no direct effect on its electoral performance. For the Conservatives in the seats they were 
defending, meanwhile, the effect of campaign spending on vote share was significant but 
negative. In other words, the harder the party fought in its own seats, the worse it did. This 
may seem counterintuitive at first blush, but it is in fact consistent with Jacobson’s (1978) 
classic account. Where they hold a seat, parties should hold the local advantage and if things 
are going well for them, should not need to campaign too hard; their candidates are likely to 
get considerable volumes of ‘free’ publicity through the local media for their activities in the 
years leading up to an election,7 which is much less likely to be the case for their opponents. 
But if they are facing a strong challenge from a rival party and risk losing the seat, there is an 
incentive to campaign harder. So greater campaign effort in its own seats can be a sign of 
weakness for a party, not of strength (hence the null or negative campaign effects). 
 
Thus far, our analyses support the repeated findings of the copious literature on constituency 
campaign effects. The harder parties campaign where they are the challenger in a seat, the 
better they do, other things being equal. But where they are defending a seat, increased 
campaign spending either has no effect on their electoral performance or can actually be 
associated with declining support. But do these effects vary depending on the changing 
contexts of the election year (H3 and H4) or of the marginality of the constituency contest 
(H5)? 
 
Of the five general elections analysed in this paper, two (1997 and 2001) were contests where 
the national result seemed a foregone conclusion before the election took place. In both cases, 
opinion polls when the election was called showed a substantial Labour lead over the 
Conservatives, sufficient to deliver a substantial Labour majority (Figure 1).8 The remaining 
                                                 
7 Many MPs write regular columns for their local newspapers, for example. 
8 Data in the figure are taken from Anthony Wells’ UK Polling Report website (http://ukpollingreport.co.uk). 
We have taken all the polls reported on the day an election was called, and on the preceding and following days, 
and have calculated the average proportions saying they would vote Conservative or Labour.  
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elections looked, at the start of the campaign, like rather closer contests: the two major parties 
were virtually tied in the polls at the start of the 2005 and 2015 campaigns, while in 2010, the 
Conservatives led Labour, but by a relatively modest margin (at least compared to Labour’s 
leads in 1997 and 2001). 
 
If H3 (overall competitiveness) is correct, therefore, we would expect more substantial 
constituency campaign effects in 2005, 2010 and 2015 (and especially in the first and last of 
these elections) than in either 1997 or 2001. Militating against this to some extent, if H4 
(dramatic turnarounds) is correct, we might anticipate a stronger campaign effect in 1997 
than in the remaining contests, as this contest produced one of the most dramatic turnarounds 
of any recent UK election. The Conservatives, who had been in government since 1979, lost 
178 seats and saw their vote fall by 11 percentage points, while Labour gained 145 seats for 
an increase of almost 9 percentage points in its vote share, giving it an unusually large 
Parliamentary majority. No other election in the series analysed here produced such a 
dramatic turnaround in party fortunes. That said, the 2010 election could arguably also be 
thought of as one where a ‘dramatic turnaround’ might have been expected,, as this election 
was widely anticipated as marking the end of 13 years of Labour majority government, even 
though the election itself was expected to be a close contest (Fisher et al, 2011, seem to see 
the 2010 contest in these terms). 
 
Below the national level, and in line with H5 (campaign/marginality interactions), we expect 
each party to enjoy more substantial campaign effects in its most marginal seats than in its 
less marginal ones. To re-iterate, we expect this to be the outcome of not just more campaign 
resources being thrown at the marginals (though there is substantial research showing that 
this is the case) but also of the more efficient use of those resources in the most marginal 
constituencies. 
 
To test these additional expectations, we re-run the regression models reported in Table 1, but 
add further variables for election year (employing dummy variables for each year, with 1997 
as the comparison) and for the two- and three-way interactions between campaign spending, 
marginality and election year. The interactions of the election year dummy variables with 
previous marginality in a constituency capture the effects of general trends in party support 
over the course of each Parliament which cannot be attributed to campaign effects in the final 
weeks before the next election. The interactions of election year and constituency campaign 
spending capture how much – if at all – constituency campaign effects changed from one 
election to another, other things being equal. The interactions between campaign spending 
and marginality test whether the efficiency of the constituency campaign varies according to 
local conditions. And the three-way interaction between margin, election year and spending 
tests whether any moderating effect of marginality on campaign effectiveness varies from 
election year to election year. The models for seats where parties were the local challengers 
ae displayed in Table 2: those for their incumbent seats are in Table 3.  
 
To aid interpretation of the interaction effects, we graph predicted vote shares from each 
model. Predictions for seats where each party was a challenger are shown in Figures 2, 3 and 
4 (for the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats respectively), while predictions 
for seats where each party was the incumbent are given in Figures 5 (Conservatives), 6 
(Labour) and 7 (Liberal Democrats).9 Each figure shows the predictions for each election in a 
                                                 
9 The figures were produced in R using the sjPlot and ggplot2 packages  (Lüdecke, 2018; Wickham, 2016; R 
Core Team, 2018). 
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separate panel. The vertical axis in each panel shows the party’s predicted vote share, while 
the horizontal axis shows the party’s constituency campaign spending percentage. To 
illustrate the effect of previous marginality, we show trend lines and confidence intervals for 
three different situations: for seats with a marginality score of -60 (shown as a solid line: 
where the party was a challenger, this means that at the preceding election it was 60 points 
behind the winner; where it was an incumbent, it was 60 points ahead of the second-placed 
party); seats with a marginality score of -30 (a dotted line); and the most marginal seats, with 
a marginality score of 0 (a dashed line).  
 
Here, we break new analytical ground, and show that electoral context (particularly at the 
constituency level) importantly modifies the conventional wisdom on campaign effects. Not 
all campaigns are equal. To see why, we need to look both at the interaction effects involving 
campaign spending in Tables 2 and 3 and at the predictions graphed in Figures 2 through 7.  
 
What is immediately clear is that, in seats where a party is the local challenger, the 
effectiveness of its local campaign depends largely on the competitiveness of the seat. For all 
three parties in all election years covered, the steepest positive slopes for the relationship 
between campaign spending and party vote share occur in the most marginal seats. The less 
marginal the constituency for the party, the shallower the regression slope, and in the least 
marginal constituencies considered here the slope is in some cases either flat (suggesting no 
campaign effect on performance) or even negative (suggesting that the harder a party 
campaigns in seats where it has little or no chance of winning, the worse it does). In most of 
the graphs displayed in Figures 2, 3 and 4, the confidence intervals for our three marginality 
conditions rarely if ever overlap, suggesting that these differences are statistically significant. 
Challenger parties tend to do better in marginal seats than in seats where they have no 
chance. But (supporting H5) while their campaign efforts in the former can further enhance 
their prospects, in the latter the marginal effects of campaigning are weaker – or even 
negative. 
 
Where parties are defending seats, the impact of marginality on campaign effectiveness is not 
as clear-cut, however. Not surprisingly, all three parties did best in the least marginal of their 
own seats (these were, by definition, the seats where they had previously recorded some of 
their best results). But for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, the regression lines 
for our three ‘marginality’ conditions do not generally differ significantly from zero, as 
indicated by the broad confidence intervals. The central predictions for those seats where the 
party expends maximum campaign effort tend to be within the confidence interval for those 
seats of similar marginality where it expends least effort (compare Figures 5 and 6): for the 
Liberal Democrats, the small number of defended seats means the confidence intervals are 
often particularly wide. 
 
Things are somewhat more complicated when we look at Labour’s campaign in seats that 
party was defending, however (Figure 6). There (and similarly for the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat campaigns in their defended seats), in 1997 and 2001 there is little clear 
evidence of Labour campaign effects, no matter how safe or marginal the seat. In 2010 there 
are signs that Labour’s campaign effort yielded extra votes in those of its own seats which 
were in our ‘middling’ marginality group (though in the most and least marginal seats 
modelled, the confidence intervals reveal that the slopes are not significant). In 2005, 
however, Labour experienced positive returns to increased campaign effort in the most 
marginal of the seats it was defending, while in both 2005 and 2015 its vote share tended to 
go down as it campaigned harder in very or moderately safe Labour seats (suggesting that 
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Jacobson’s insight regarding the impact of campaigning in one’s own seats might also in 
some cases be moderated by how close the local contest is).  
 
Overall, however, our analyses suggest support for H5. This is especially true in seats where a 
party was the local challenger in an election. There, the more marginal the seat, the larger the 
campaign ‘boost’ a party enjoyed from marginally increasing its campaign effort. 
 
What of the hypotheses drawn from Fisher et al.’s (2011) arguments concerning the influence 
of the national campaign context on constituency campaign effects? There is certainly 
evidence that constituency campaign effects can vary from election year to election year, at 
least in seats where a party is the local challenger: in those seats, the coefficients for the 
interactions between campaign spending and election year are all significant for all three 
parties. However, the patterns are not as straightforward as suggested by H3 (overall 
competitiveness) or H4 (dramatic turnarounds).  Holding other factors constant, Conservative 
campaigning in seats where it was the challenger yielded larger marginal effects than in 1997 
in each subsequent election – though the relative size of the boost was not much larger in the 
more marginal national contests of 2005, 2010 and 2015 than was the case in the 
considerably less competitive national race of 2001. For Labour and the Liberal Democrats, 
meanwhile, the 1997 campaign effect in seats where they were challengers seems to have 
been a high water mark, other things being equal: in subsequent election years, the 
interactions between campaign spend and election year suggest that the marginal effect of 
campaigning diminished somewhat (and again, with little clear connection to how 
competitive the national contest was).  
 
In seats defended by each of the major parties, however, the interactions between election 
year and campaign spending and the three-way interactions including past marginality were 
almost invariably insignificant. That suggests that where parties were the local incumbent, the 
national election context did not make much difference to the (non-)effect of their local 
campaign efforts (an impression which, as noted above, is largely borne out by inspection of 
Figures 5 and 7).  Overall, therefore, it is hard to see much consistent evidence here for H6: 
the competitiveness of the national contest did not consistently have the predicted impact on 
constituency campaign effects. 
 
The ‘dramatic turnarounds’ hypothesis (H4) fares slightly better, at least for Labour and 
Liberal Democrat campaigns in the most marginal of the constituencies where those parties 
were challengers (see Figures 6 and 7). For these parties in those seats, the steepest regression 
lines (and hence the most striking positive campaign effects) occurred in the ultra-marginal 
seats in 1997, the election which most closely approximates a ‘dramatic turnaround’ contest. 
But 2010, which in some ways could be considered a ‘dramatic turnaround’ contest, does not 
show such clear-cut patterns: the three trend lines for Labour predicted vote in seats where 
the party was a challenger in that election overlap very substantially, while the equivalent 
lines for the Liberal Democrats in 2010 are largely parallel, suggesting that differences are to 
do how competitive the party was in each group of seats, not with differences in how local 








While there is now widespread agreement that local campaign efforts can and do pay 
electoral dividends, less attention has been devoted to accounting for fluctuations over time 
and place in the marginal benefits they bring. In this paper, we demonstrate that these 
fluctuations can be relatively substantial. While the net impact of each party’s constituency 
campaigning on its vote share is generally positive across time and across different local 
contexts (as captured by the marginality of the constituency contest and whether a party was 
the local incumbent), the size of the marginal effect varies. Furthermore, in some situations 
the net effect of a party’s campaign disappears, while in others (especially in uncompetitive 
seats) its net campaign effect, perversely, can even be negative (the harder it campaigns 
locally the fewer votes it wins, other things being equal). Parties ignore their constituency 
campaigns at their peril, therefore, and wise parties co-ordinate their local resources with care 
to maximise their returns. But wise parties should also not take the efficacy of their 
constituency ground wars for granted. Just like the value of stocks and shares, the returns to 
local campaigning can go down as well as up. 
 
Accounting for these fluctuations is much more challenging, however. In the course of the 
paper we have looked at two plausible potential explanations derived from Fisher et al.’s 
(2011) arguments: the overall competitiveness of the national contest;  and dramatic national 
election turnarounds. Neither receives unambiguous support. While they seem to ‘fit’ some 
parties at some of the elections, none provides a truly satisfactory explanation, and in every 
case there are notable exceptions, where the purported effect is expected but is not seen. 
However, we see clearer support not only for the ‘conventional’ finding that constituency 
campaign spending is more beneficial for a party where it is the local challenger than where it 
is the incumbent defending a seat, but also for the moderating effect of constituency 
marginality. Constituency campaign efforts seem to help parties to win more votes in 
marginal seats where they are the challenger than in seats where their prospects are less 
favourable or in seats they already hold. In part, this is a simple function of more resources 
being expended on such marginal races. But our results show (for the first time) that there is 
something more going on. The campaign effect in these marginals is not just a function of 
more resources but also of the more efficient use of those resources. Parties get more 
campaign bang for their buck in seats where they lost at the previous election by narrow 
margins than elsewhere. The efficiency of campaign spending varies according to the 
marginality of the seat – and in rational and predictable ways. 
 
Given the results reported above, we are sceptical of general explanations concerning the 
national electoral context for fluctuating campaign effects. Rather, we suspect the answer lies 
partly in more ephemeral and less generalizable factors, reflecting the quality of each party’s 
campaign, and what other parties are doing at the same time. It is not enough, for instance, to 
set and achieve plans for contacting a set number of voters in key target seats. Who is 
contacted, and what messages they are given, is liable to be important too. But, more than 
that, the answer lies in local geographies of party support: campaigns matter more and have 
larger effects in places where the race is close than where it is not – and particularly for the 





Acknowledgements   
We are grateful to the editor, Halvard Buhaug, and the anonymous referees for their valuable 







Barwell, G. 2016. How to Win a Marginal Seat: My Year Fighting for my Political Life. 
London: Biteback Books.  
Benoit, K. and Marsh, D. 2003. Campaign spending effects in the Irish local election of 1999. 
Party Politics. 9, 561-582. 
Denver, D. and Hands. G. 1996. Constituency campaigning in the 1992 General Election: the 
peculiar case of the Conservatives. In Farrell, D.M., Broughton, D., Denver, D. and Fisher, 
J. (eds.). British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1996. London: Frank Cass. 
Denver, D. and Hands, G. 1997. Modern Constituency Electioneering: Local Campaigning in 
the 1992 General Election. London: Frank Cass. 
Fieldhouse, E. and Cutts, D. 2009. The effectiveness of local party campaigns in 2005: 
combining evidence from campaign spending and agent survey data. British Journal of 
Political Science. 39: 367-388. 
Fisher, J., Cutts, D. and Fieldhouse, E. 2011. The electoral effectiveness of constituency 
campaigning in the 2010 British General Election: the ‘triumph’ of Labour? Electoral 
Studies. 30: 816-828.  
Fisher, J and Denver, D. 2008. From foot-slogging to call centres and direct mail: a 
framework for analysing the development of district-level campaigning. European Journal 
of Political Research. 47: 794-826. 
Fisher, J., Johnston, R., Cutts, D., Pattie, C. and Fieldhouse, E. 2014. You get what you 
(don’t) pay for: the impact of volunteer labour and candidate spending at the 2010 British 
General Election. Parliamentary Affairs. 67, 804-824. 
Fowler, A. 2018. A Bayesian explanation for the effect of incumbency. Electoral Studies. 53, 
67-78. 
Gordon, I. and Whiteley, P. 1980. Comment: Johnston on campaign expenditure and the 
efficacy of advertising. Political Studies. 28, 293-294. 
Jacobson, G. 1978. The effects of campaign spending in Congressional elections. American 
Political Science Review. 72: 469-491. 
Jacobson, G. 1990. The effects of campaign spending in House elections: new evidence for 
old arguments. American Journal of Political Science. 34: 334-362. 
Johnston, R.J. 1987. Money and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Election 
Results. London: Croom Helm. 
Johnston, R., Cutts, D., Pattie, C. and Fisher, J. 2012. We’ve got them on the list: contacting, 
canvassing and voting in a British general election campaign. Electoral Studies 31, 317-
329. 
Johnston, R., Hartman, T. and Pattie, C. 2018. Spending, canvassing and electoral success in 
marginal constituencies. England and Scotland in 2017. Journal of Elections, public 
Opinion and Parties. (in press).  
Johnston, R. and Pattie, C. 2006. Putting Voters in Their Place: Geography and Elections in 
Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
15 
 
Johnston, R. and Pattie, C. 2014. Money and Electoral Politics: Local Parties and Funding in 
General Elections. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Lüdecke, D. 2018. sjPlot: Data Visualisation for Statistics in Social Science. 
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=sjPlot. 
Norris, P. 2000. A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-industrial Societies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pattie, C., Hartman, T. and Johnston, R. 2017. Incumbent parties, incumbent MPs and the 
effectiveness of constituency campaigns: evidence from the 2015 UK general election. 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 19, 824-841. 
Pattie, C. and Johnston, R. 2009. Still talking, but is anyone listening? The changing face of 
constituency campaigning in Britain, 1997-2005. Party Politics. 15, 411-434. 
Pattie, C. and Johnston, R. 2016. ‘Resourcing the constituency campaign in the UK’. Party 
Politics, 22(2), 203-214. 
Pattie, C., Johnston, R. and Fieldhouse, E. 1995. Winning the local vote: the effectiveness of 
constituency campaign spending in Great Britain. American Political Science Review. 89: 
969-983. 
Pattie C., Whiteley P., Johnston R. and Seyd, P. 1994. Measuring local campaign effects: 
Labour party constituency campaigning at the 1987 General Election. Political Studies. 42, 
469-479. 
R Core Team. 2018. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. Vienna: R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing, https://www.R-project.org/ 
Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. 1997. Media Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies. 
Plymouth: Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre. 
Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. 2007. Media Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies 
(Fifth Periodical Review). Plymouth: Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre. 
Whiteley, P. and Seyd, P. 2003. Party Election Campaigning in Britain: the Labour party. Party 
Politics. 9, 637-652. 
Wickham, H. 2016. ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Wood, D.M. and Norton, P. 1992. Do candidates matter? Constituency-specific vote changes 





Table 1: Campaign spending and party vote share 1997-2015: OLS models 
 
  Con % vote Lab % vote LD % vote 
A) Seats party lost at previous election B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 26.052 0.599** 12.433 0.389** 9.517 0.459** 
Party margin at previous election  0.338 0.011** 0.234 0.017** 0.015 0.011 
Party short campaign spend  0.131 0.006** 0.294 0.007** 0.242 0.005** 
R2 0.681   0.622   0.536   
N 1920   1415  2759  
  Con % vote Lab % vote LD % vote 
B) Seats party won at previous election B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 53.828 1.077** 39.189 1.015** 38.788 5.682** 
Party margin at previous election  -0.233 0.018** -0.418 0.014** -0.198 0.072** 
Party short campaign spend  -0.140 0.012* 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.059 
R2 0.255   0.380   0.025   
N 1175   1677  226  
 






Table 2: Modelling the effect of campaign spending on vote share in seats where party is the 
challenger, 1997-2015: OLS regressions 
  Con % vote Lab % vote LD % vote 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 24.169 1.619** 4.852 1.138** 8.341 1.173** 
Party margin at previous election  0.291 0.049** -0.249 0.118* -0.0002 0.028 
Party short campaign spend  0.059 0.022** 0.432 0.015** 0.363 0.016** 
Election year (comparison = 1997)       
2001 3.034 2.722 13.708 1.572** 4.272 1.490** 
2005 3.748 2.421 13.338 1.512** 8.724 1.606** 
2010 1,997 2.552 5.771 1.369** 13.081 1.583** 
2015 2.454 1.961 8.214 1.308** -3.385 1.398* 
Party margin * party spend 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.002** 0.005 0.000** 
Year 2001*party margin -0.009 0.066 0.427 0.143** 0.032 0.034 
Year 2005 * party margin 0.023 0.064 0.485 0.134** 0.062 0.308 
Year 2010 * party margin -0.016 0.069 0.446 0.132** 0.179 0.042** 
Year 2015 * party margin 0.073 0.061 0.421 0.125** 0.045 0.039 
Year 2001 * party spend 0.073 0.033* -0.237 0.028** -0.081 0.022** 
Year 2005 * party spend 0.100 0.031** -0.296 0.029** -0.117 0.024** 
Year 2010 * party spend 0.129 0.032** -0.199 0.026** -0.211 0.022** 
Year 2015 * party spend 0.103 0.028** -0.178 0.020** -0.180 0.024** 
Year 2001*party margin * party spend -0.0004 0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.001 
Year 2005 * party margin * party spend 0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.003** -0.003 0.001** 
Year 2010 * party margin * party spend 0.001 0.001 -0.014 0.003** -0.004 0.001** 
Year 2015 * party margin * party spend 0.001 0.001 -0.009 0.002** -0.002 0.001 
R2 0.66  0.692  0.774  
N 1920   1415  2759  
 




Table 3: Modelling the effect of campaign spending on vote share in seats where party is the 
incumbent, 1997-2015: OLS regressions 
  Con % vote Lab % vote LD % vote 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 20.517 4.167** 53.143 3.671** 106.906 61.756 
Party margin at previous election  -0.702 0.156** -0.435 0.102** 2.803 3.858 
Party short campaign spend  0.116 0.046* 0.006 0.044 -0.663 0.637 
Election year (comparison = 1997)          
2001 12.292 6.864 -17.043 5.293** -63.699 64.687 
2005 19.121 6.131** -23.935 4.816** -52.614 66.605 
2010 20.742 5.572** -24.847 4.412** -96.054 62.943 
2015 25.251 4.774** -14.753 4.397** -99.340 61.927 
Party margin * party spend 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.030 0..040 
Year 2001*party margin -0.127 0.411 -0.128 0.134 -3.001 4.014 
Year 2005 * party margin 0.155 0.300 -0.286 0.132* -2.699 4.101 
Year 2010 * party margin 0.187 0.230 -0.082 0.130 -4.281 3.902 
Year 2015 * party margin 0.264 0.183 -0.339 0.139* -3.415 3.853 
Year 2001 * party spend -0.0001 0.076 0.065 0.062 0.703 0.670 
Year 2005 * party spend -0.064 0.071 0.077 0.058 0.543 0.692 
Year 2010 * party spend -0.070 0.063 0.043 0.054 1.037 0.652 
Year 2015 * party spend -0.143 0.054** 0.042 0.056 0.856 0.640 
Year 2001*party margin * party spend 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.032 0.042 
Year 2005 * party margin * party spend -0.0003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.026 0.043 
Year 2010 * party margin * party spend -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.046 0.041 
Year 2015 * party margin * party spend -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002** 0.033 0.041 
R2 0.703   0.691   0.553   
N 1175   1677  226  
 
Standard errors in brackets. * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 
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Figure 7: Predicting Liberal Democrat vote share in seats where the party is an incumbent, 1997-2015: Visualising interactions 
 
